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Abstract
This model provides a framework for helping to understand and analyze the airport security
problem. By modeling the security process, and identifying the weak points, we were able to
make recommendations for possible Federal initiatives through legislative or management action
to close the identified security loopholes. Passenger flow through the ticket counter, security
station, and gate, which potentially includes terrorists, is modeled and quantified. A probability
model estimates the probability of a terrorist escaping detection at the various stations. This
probability is a function of the reliability of a proposed security database and the reliability of
security equipment. The influence of these reliabilities on the probability of non detection is
studied. In addition, a commonly overlooked security problem -- overloading security personnel
with passenger traffic to the extent that they are distracted from thoroughly checking passengers -
- is modeled and analyzed. Model quantitative results are used to delineate the implications for
changes in security policy at the nation's airports.
Introduction
A model of airport security is proposed and executed. The model involves the flow of a
group of passengers, who wish to board a given aircraft, to ticket counters, security stations,
airline gates, and aircraft. By confining the security problem in this way, the very difficult
problem of airport security analysis is simplified. Why do we develop such a model? An
important reason is: "Airports and ticket counters have been attacked, and even airline offices
have not been spared in terrorist attempts to intimidate governments and prevent the western
public from flying. Terrorists simply cannot leave airports alone, nor does it make sense to do so,
since they are the weak point in Western defenses" [JOH9 1]. And this was written before 9/11!
By way of historical perspective, in 1973 the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) specified
that the three critical security areas in airports are the ticket counter, boarding gate, and the
aircraft [JOH91]. Curiously, the security station (i.e., luggage x-ray station) is omitted.
According to [JOH91], technology has not kept pace with the threat: terrorists exploit
existing technology, airports upgrade their technology, but terrorists outwit that technology, in a
never-ending cycle. "we will always be in a position where deterrence presupposes a rational
adversary" [JOH911].
This model contains new concepts as follows: improve the reliability of airport security
equipment; implement a security database in airports that do not have this capability; improve the
reliability of security databases in airports where they exist; and alleviate queuing problems at
airline passenger stations and airport security facilities. If these measures are implemented by
Congressional funding and enabling legislation, the threat of terrorist attacks should be reduced at
the nation's airports.
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The severity of the problem is dramatized by the following findings:
Pre 9/11 Aviation Unpreparedness
WASHINGTON - The Federal Aviation Administration received repeated warnings in the
months prior to Sept. 11, 2001, about al-Qaeda and its desire to attack airlines, according to a
previously undisclosed report by the commission that investigated the terror attacks [MSN05].
The report by the 9/11 commission that investigated the suicide airliner attacks on the World
Trade Center and the Pentagon detailed 52 such warnings given to FAA leaders from April to
Sept. 10, 2001, about the radical Islamic terrorist group and its leader, Osama bin Laden. The
commission report, written last August, said five security warnings mentioned al-Qaeda's training
for hijackings and two reports concerned suicide operations not connected to aviation. However,
none of the warnings pinpointed what would happen on Sept. 11. FAA spokeswoman Laura
Brown said the agency received intelligence from other agencies, which it passed on to airlines
and airports. But, she said, "We had no specific information about means or methods that would
have enabled us to tailor any countermeasures." Brown also said the FAA was in the process of
tightening security at the time of the attacks. "We were spending $100 million a year to deploy
explosive detection equipment at the airports," she said. The agency was also close to issuing a
regulation that would have set higher standards for screeners and, for the first time, give it direct
control over the screening work force. [911 ] However, there are few airports, today, that have
explosive detection equipment installed. In addition, simulated tests have shown that it is possible
to pass screener detection in major U.S. airports, while carrying concealed weapons. Thus, the
need for a model that can pinpoint vulnerabilities in airport security.
Findings from the 9/11 Commission: [911]
"* Aviation officials were "lulled into a false sense of security" and "intelligence that
indicated a real and growing threat leading up to 9/11 did not stimulate significant
increases in security procedures."
"* Of the FAA's 105 daily intelligence summaries between April 1, 2001, and Sept.10,
2001, 52 mentioned Osama bin Laden, al Qaeda, or both, "mostly in regard to overseas
threats."
"* The FAA did not expand the use of in-flight air marshals or tighten airport screening for
weapons. It said FAA officials were more concerned with reducing airline congestion,
lessening delays and easing air carriers' financial problems than thwarting a terrorist
attack.
"* A proposed rule to improve passenger screening and other security measures ordered by
Congress in 1996 had been held up by the Office of Management and Budget and was
still not in effect when the attacks occurred, according to the FAA.
Passenger and Baggage Screening
The Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) made overall aviation
transportation security a direct federal responsibility for the first time [DHS05]. The
Transportation Security Administration's (TSA) responsibilities include ensuring screening of
passengers through a mix of federal and private screeners and technology. The screener
workforce consists of 45,000 screeners located at 448 airports. The screeners are supported by
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technology, including x-ray machines, explosive trace detection machines, and explosive
detection systems. U.S. air carriers transport 12.5 tons of cargo, 2.8 tons of which is secured on
passenger planes. The remaining 9.7 million tons is shipped in cargo planes; air freight remains a
serious threat to the nation. TSA is charged with closing this security vulnerability. While
obviously important, air freight security is beyond the scope of this research.
Despite all of the above, according to [BEN05], "We are spending nearly $5 billion each year
on passenger and baggage screening systems, yet lethal weapons still are getting past security and
onto planes. While we have devoted enormous attention and resources to improving aviation
security, it is still far too easy for a terrorist to get a weapon on a passenger plane. The
Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Inspector General, the Government Accountability
Office (GAO), and the TSA have conducted tests on TSA screeners at the nation's airports and
found surprisingly high failure rates. An alarming number of prohibited items are still not being
detected during checks of passengers, carry-on items, and checked baggage". In addition,
according to [CKE05], DHS has been slow to deploy equipment and technology that could aid
airport screeners in detecting concealed weapons and explosives.
Air Cargo
"While airline passengers may be screened, cargo beneath their feet is not. The TSA has
identified two critical risks to air cargo "(1) The hostile takeover of an all-cargo aircraft leading to
its use as a weapon; and (2) the use of cargo to introduce an explosive device onboard a passenger
aircraft in order to cause catastrophic damage. Terrorists have exploited the lack of cargo security
on several occasions. For example, a device in a baggage container of Pan Am Flight 103 caused
the flight to explode in 1988 over Lockerbie, Scotland.4. An explosion aboard a U.S. airliner in
1979 was caused by a parcel linked to the "Unabomber" Theodore Kaczynski and shipped as air
cargo. While Congress has mandated tripling air cargo screening, a large portion of commercial
air cargo remain unscreened. TSA relies heavily on the "Known Shipper" program, under which
only approved companies may ship cargo on passenger aircraft. A company can become a
"Known Shipper" with practically no security checks" [BEN05].
PRINCIPLES OF MODELING AND SYSTEMS ENGINEERING
Since modeling is the central tool used in this research, it is appropriate to outline the
methodology and spirit of this quantitative approach to problem solving. In particular, we
describe the operations research (OR) approach to model development [HIL01] and systems
thinking as exemplified in the field of systems engineering [TUR93]. First, we outline the steps in
an OR study, annotated with the relevance to the airport security model.
1. Define the problem of interest and gather relevant data.
The problem of interest is to improve the security of the nation's airports. An
important facet of problem definition is to identify the decision makers. For airport
security, these are the managers in the FAA, TSA, and airport and airline executives.
Unfortunately, with few exceptions, there is not much published data on airport
security available. Our search of the Transportation Research Information Services
and the Transportation Research Board. databases did not yield relevant data, such as
airline terrorist threat incidents. Thus, we resort to the use of randomized
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hypothetical, but realistic data, and sensitivity analysis to compensate for the data
void. We also subject the model to extreme value testing (e.g., using values of
probability of terrorist non detection that seem unlikely, but, nevertheless, might
occur in an airport security system), as a form of sensitivity analysis, to note the
effect on the solution [HILO I].
2. Formulate a mathematical model to represent the problem.
Since little is known with certainty about the details of the airport security problem,
we use a probabilistic approach to estimating the quantities of interest, such as the
probability of not detecting a terrorist by the time he reaches the gate, if he has not
been detected prior to this point. No model can be a complete representation of the
real system. If it were, it would be incomprehensible and mathematically intractable.
Thus, we extract from the real world of airport security the key factors, such as the
probability of non detection, as opposed to attempting to model every movement of a
terrorist in an airport. Note that our focus is on non detection because we wish to
emphasize the probability of a terrorist escaping apprehension.
3. Develop a computer-based procedure for deriving solutions to the problem from the
model.
A spreadsheet approach is used because sensitivity analysis of the solutions can be
performed conveniently and plots of the solutions can be obtained easily.
4. Test the model and refine it as needed.
Although we are unable to test the model in an airport at this time, we perform reality
checks on the solutions. That is, we check the model assumptions, solutions, and
sensitivity analyses to see whether they comport with reality (e.g., a solution of
99.9% probability of terrorist detection would be considered unrealistically
optimistic). If such a solution emerged, we would modify the model to produce a
more realistic result.
5. Prepare for the ongoing application of the model as prescribed by management.
This step is beyond the scope of this research because, at this stage, the model is a
proposal that may be considered for implementation by FAA, TSA, and airport, and
airline managers. The details of implementation would be a decision taken by theses
managers.
6. Implement the model.
Examples of implementation details are the following: training of airport personnel in
the revised passenger security process, implementing the security database and
terrorist detection procedures, and installing equipment to detect biological,
chemical, and nuclear weapons. Biological agents and toxins are of particular
concem [CSI04].
A key piece of legislation pertaining to biological terror is the Intelligence Reform
and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004 that contains various provisions to promote
and accelerate the use of biometric technology for secure identification. The law




Now, we explore how systems engineering concepts can be applied to airport security. In
this vein, an aspect of the origin of systems thinking was the realization that that particular
objects are comprised of components and these components are interrelated and independent
[TUR93]. The following Table 0 portrays the airport security example, showing current security
holes that could be rectified by using a database ID check at the Security Station and Gate:
Table 0. Airport Security Object
Components Related By Security Control
Boarding Pass and Database Security Equipment
ID
Ticket Counter x x Does not apply
Security Station x Security Hole x




One of the critical developments relative to the origins of systems thinking is that of
cause and ej'Lct. When a particular component behaves in a certain way, a different component in
the related object reacts in a predictable way. [TUR93] For example:
If a passenger (component P) fails a database ID check, then an agent (component A)
reacts to detain component P.
Furthermore, the behavior of component P can only be understood by identifying and
characterizing the impact of components on each other (e.g., component A checks the database)
and the influence of the components on the object (i.e., airport security system) [TUR93].
OBJECTIVE
According to [HILOI], the first order of business in an OR study is to define the
objective. Accordingly, we state that our objective is to identify weak points (e.g., security station
check) and links (e.g., passenger flow between security check station and gate) in the security
process for the purpose of influencing government legislation and regulations to strengthen the
process. We feel the subject of this research is extremely important because "America is not
sufficiently prepared to fully respond to a catastrophic terrorist attack on U.S. soil that involves
chemical, radiological, or nuclear weapons" [CS104].
MOTIVATION
Consistent with the objective, we relate our experience at an airport that indicates the
need for improvement in airport security. Instead of focusing on security measures, like a high
reliability and comprehensive security database, which would significantly enhance security, the
TSA, in some instances, spends considerable time on trivial matters. For example, we were
recently passengers at the one of the nation's airports. We were carrying a stapler in our briefcase.
After the case went through the x-ray machine, and signaled an alert, the TSA agent asked to
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open the case. She saw that the "offending object" was the stapler. She then removed the stapler
from the case, put it in a basket, and sent the case and basket through the x-ray machine again. It
seemed obvious that the only object in the case -- the only metal object -- that could have signaled
an alert was the stapler. Thus, the process should have stopped after the case was opened. Instead
of paying TSA personnel to spend time on trivial searches, the TSA should invest in a security
database and in improving the reliability of security station equipment.
In addition to seemly non productive security processes, as described above, certain
proposed legislation, does not appear to be helpful. For example, a provision of immigration bill
HR418, which passed the House of Representatives, would require: "that information on anyone
convicted of using a false driver's license to board an airplane be added to aviation security
screening databases" [HOU05]. The trouble with this provision is that it "closes the barn door
after the horse is out of the barn". No terrorist is going to try to use the same identification again,
if his identification had been discovered as false! It is important to note that there have been
proposals for standardizing the driver's license [WAR05], which could become, in effect, a
national identification card. With such a card, it would be difficult to fake identification; thus, the
probability of non detection would be decreased. This is an issue currently being debated by
Congress. It is not clear that such legislation will be passed because of the opposition of privacy
advocates.
Other examples of airport security problems that motivate our research are the following:
Background on Airport Security Issues
Selected Items from Terrorist Detection History
This section illustrates why airport security is a problem and why we are motivated to
study the problem. A critical aspect of successful terrorist and weapons detection is the quality
and appropriateness of the detection tests. The following reports from the media illustrate some of
the problems in conducting successful tests:
How NOT TO TEST AIRPORT SECURITY, SCHNEIER ON SECURITY, DECEMBER 20,
2004[BBC05]
If this were fiction, no one would believe it. Four days after police at Charles de Gaulle
Airport slipped some plastic explosives into a random passenger's bag as part of an exercise for
sniffer dogs, it is still missing -- and authorities are stumped and embarrassed. It is perfectly
reasonable to plant an explosive-filled suitcase in an airport in order to test security. It is not okay
to plant it in someone's bag without his knowledge and permission. (The explosive residue could
remain on the suitcase long after the test, and might be picked up by one of those trace mass
spectrometers that detects the chemical residue associated with bombs.) But if you are going to
plant plastic explosives in the suitcase of some innocent passenger, shouldn't you at least write
down which suitcase it was?
US airport security loses 'bomb' [BBC05]
Security screeners at a US airport lost track of a bag containing fake explosives and allowed to be
loaded on a flight to Amsterdam. The "bomb" was planted in luggage for training exercise at
Newark Liberty International Airport. A scanning machine raised the alarm, but the bag was not
searched and airport staff lost track of it. "At no time did the bag pose a threat and at no time was
anyone in danger," said a transport security spokeswoman.
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Airport Security Data
Since, with certain exceptions, airport security data is either classified or unavailable, we
have had to resort, in this model, to use hypothetical but realistic data to illustrate the principles
of the model. See the Appendix for the spreadsheet data and the results of example computations.
In future research, we will attempt to collect data about security attacks from reports, web sites,
and the Department of Homeland Security DHS).
Information flow rates, queue characteristics, etc., which are used in the analytic model, are
expected or mean values. If instantaneous values of these variables are desired, simulation must
be used. The values of quantities used in the examples are for illustrative purposes. Sensitivity
analysis is performed to protect against choosing certain values in the examples. As Cordesman
points out, probabilities based on history may be worthless (e.g., pattern of past no indicator of
9/11 attack). It is better to use "what if' analysis [COR, p. 25]. It is important to consider worst
case scenarios [COR, p. 33]. Many of the model variables are randomized to provide further
protection again bias. An example of "what if "analysis is covered in the What If section.
Threats
Now, we consider the flow of passengers, wherein one or more could be terrorists, and a
threat to innocent passengers, through the ticketing, security checking, and boarding process, as
depicted in Figure 0.
Definitions
Refer to Figure 0 when reading the definitions:
Facilities: ticket counter (A), security station (S), and gate (G).
Pt is the probability that a passenger (on the aircraft) is a terrorist, mean Z .05 [CRS04], N is
the estimated number of possible terrorists who are ticketed on Plane P (N is assumed to be in the
range 1,,, 10), and C is the capacity of P. A mean value for P would be appropriate to use, if C
were a constant. However, just considering the Boeing Company alone, there are ten commercial
models, with the capacity in number of passengers, shown in Table I [BOE05]. Therefore, it is
appropriate to consider Pt as a variable, and to calculate it as Pt = N / C.
Table 1. Boeing Company Commercial Aircraft Models












PA is the probability that the terrorist will be detected at the ticket counter by querying the
security database. Specifically, this probability is a function of the accuracy and completeness of
the security database and of the type of identification IA presented by the passenger at the ticket
counter. Although the probabilities of detection at the ticket counter, security station, and gate
differ in the real world, they are treated as equal in this model because 1) we have no evidence to
the contrary and 2) the assumption of equality is mitigated by randomizing these quantities in the
model.
The probability that the terrorist will be detected at the ticket counter is of particular
relevance in light of the El Al airlines practice of requiring complete identification of the
passenger when purchasing a ticket to allow security officials to compile a reference file on the
passenger [JOH91]. Although this is an excellent practice, it is not clear that it would be
acceptable to American airline passengers.
Rd is the reliability of the security database. Specifically, this is the probability of the
database operating without failure during the security checks at the three stations. It is assumed
that the reliabilities at the three facilities are equal, since this feature is new in airports, with little
information available about operating characteristics.
Ps is the probability that the terrorist will be detected at the security station by querying the
security database or by performing the luggage check. Specifically, this probability is a function
of the accuracy and completeness of the security database and of the type of identification Is
presented by the passenger at the security station and the accuracy of the luggage checking
equipment.
Rs is the reliability of the security checking equipment. Specifically, this is the probability of
the security checking equipment at the three facilities operating without failure during the
security checks. As in the case of Rd, it is assumed that the reliabilities at the three facilities are
equal, because we have no information to the contrary.
PG is the probability that the terrorist will be detected at the gate by querying the security
database. Specifically, this probability is a function of the accuracy and completeness of the
security database and of the type of identification IG presented by the passenger at the gate.
In later sections, we use the following additional definitions:
PAf, probability of non detection at the ticket counter.
Psf, probability of non detection at the security station.
PGf, probability of non detection at the gate.
PGs, probability of detection at the gate.
Rd., overall reliability that is decomposed into the reliabilities of the primary and secondary
security databases, Rd, and Rd2, respectively.
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Ro overall reliability that is decomposed into the reliabilities of the primary and secondary
security equipment, Rs1 and R,2, respectively.
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Pt: probability that passenger is a terrorist i terrogation
PA: probability of detecting terrorist at Ticket Counter|
Ps: probability of detecting terrorist at Security Station
PG: probability of detecting terrorist at Gate
Rs: reliability of Security Station equipment
Rd: reliability of security database
T: terrorist identification in the database
1: passenger identification
C: plane capacity
N: number of passengers who are terrorists
Assumption: The events and variables in the analysis are assumed to be independent. Thus,
their probabilities can be multiplied. This assumption seems reasonable because there is no
dependence among the events of security checking at the three facilities and facility reliabilities.
Terrorist Scenario
Before we begin the scenario, let us consider the fact that multiple checks against a database
are needed, even if this seems counter intuitive, for the following reason:
Assume that X is not a Muslim, but is part of a terrorist plot. X has a ticket under a false
name - the name of Y and a false photo ID with the name of Y. X passes the check at the airline
check in counter. Next, X gives his ticket to Y, a Muslim, who has a photo ID. Y goes to the
security station and presents "his ticket" and photo ID. Although Y's name on his ticket and ID
match, a search of the database shows that the ticketed person, X, is not a Muslim, and Y is
detained for further investigation. Of course, if the database contains Y's photo, X would have
been stopped at the ticket counter, but the reviewer did not make this point.
Picture the scenario shown in Figure 0, where a passenger, who may have biological,
chemical, or nuclear weapons in his luggage, stops first at the ticket counter (A) to check in. In
this model, airline and security personnel access a security database that contains information
about people who are considered possible security threats; their identification is designated by T.
Passengers have identification IA at the ticket counter, Is at the security station, and IG at the gate.
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The reason for the three identifications is that a passenger could use a different identification at
each facility. If a database check results in T = IA, or T = Is, or T = IG, the passenger is detained
for interrogation. At the start of the interrogation, the passenger is assumed to not be a terrorist;
however, subsequent questioning may suggest otherwise. If the passenger passes the ticket
counter check, he proceeds to the security station (S), which is staffed by TSA and airport
personnel. The same database check process takes place again. Why? The reason is that no
database and computer system is 100% reliable. It is possible that the passenger is a terrorist and
the ticket counter check failed to reveal this fact. Of course, the converse is possible. This is why
there should be presumed innocence at the start of the interrogation. Unfortunately, currently, the
drivers license is the main means of passenger identification, and it is not standardized among the
states. As Richard Clark points out, airline agents make no attempt to validate passenger
identification [CLA05]. Perhaps, a national identification card is needed, but this might be
considered a violation of civil liberties.
This process is repeated at the gate (G). If a terrorist manages to pass all three checks, he
is allowed on board the aircraft. Of course, we want this event to have a very low probability.
Subsequent sections will address how this could be achieved.
Events
The events pertinent to the process of terrorist detection are listed below.
1. Terrorist detected at ticket counter (A)
2. Terrorist not detected at ticket counter (A)
3. Terrorist detected at security station (S)
4. Terrorist not detected at security station (S)
5. Terrorist detected at gate (G)
6. Terrorist not detected at gate (G)
Definitions
The nomenclature of stations and their associated events are defined below.
A, S, and G are called stations
Events 1, 3, and 5 are independent (i.e., detection at a given station does not depend on detection
at other stations).
Events 2, 4, and 6 are independent (i.e., non detection at a given station does not depend on non
detection at other stations).
Event Sequences
The sequence of events that transpire in the attempt to detect a terrorist is captures in the
event transitions that follow.
A. Start - Event I - Terrorist stopped for interrogation at A
B. Start - Event 2 - Event 3 - Terrorist stopped for interrogation at S
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Figure ASG. Airport Passenger Flow Diagram
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Events
1 Terrorist detected at ticket counter (A)
2 Terrorist not detected at ticket counter (A)
3 Terrorist detected at security station (S)
4 Terrorist not detected at security station (S)
5 Terrorist detected at ticket gate (G)
6 Terrorist not detected at gate (G)
C. Start -- Event 2 -- Event 4 -- Event 5 -- Terrorist stopped for interrogation at G
D. Start -- Event 2 -- Event 4 -- Event 6 -- Terrorist not detected at A, S, and G
Event Sequences A, B, C, and D are independent (i.e., the fact that a terrorist is stopped at a given
station does not depend on being stopped at other stations)
The event sequences A, B, C, and D and events 1 ... , 6 in the passenger flow process are
depicted in Figure ASG.
Probabilities
p: probability of terrorist not being detected on any given attempt at passing a single security
check, independent of his location in the airport at any given time. This is a function of the
accuracy and comprehensiveness of the security database and of the accuracy of security
equipment (e.g., luggage x-ray equipment). Thus, p becomes the key probability in the model
because we are modeling the process of the terrorist attempting to go undetected at the ticket
counter, security station, and gate.
I - p: probability of terrorist being detected on a given attempt at passing a single security check.
This probability is also a function of the accuracy and comprehensiveness of the security database
and of the accuracy of security equipment.
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Binomial Distribution
The binomial distribution describes the possible number of times n that a particular event
(e.g., terrorist non detection) will occur in a sequence of observations (e.g., at the ticket counter,
security station, and gate). The binomial distribution is used when a researcher is interested in the
probability of an event occurring. The binomial distribution is specified by the number of
observations, x (e.g., number of times a passenger is subjected to a security check), and the
probability of occurrence, which is denoted by p (e.g., probability of non detection).
Definitions
n trails: number of possible attempts by terrorist to avoid detection
n = 3 (A, S, G)
x: given number of attempts by terrorist to avoid detection
Apply Binomial Distribution
Our objective is to estimate the probability of non detection at A, S, and G, as a function of p,
for the purpose of determining the threat posed by a terrorist at each of these stations.
Therefore, we have, according to the binomial distribution,
P= n! Px (_~-x!(n-x)! P(-~-
(1)
Why is it necessary to use the probability P when p has already been defined? The reason is
that p does not take into account the number qf times x that the terrorist attempts detection out
of n = 3 possible attempts. The probability p only pertains to the event of non detection,
independent of the number of attempts.
The following Table Event summarizes the application of the binomial distribution as it is
applied to the quantities n, x, P, and p and the events 2, 4, 6, and 5, showing that the
P exhausts the probability space.
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Table Event. n = 3
event x P
2 Not detected 1 3! 1(1 - 2  3 p- 6 p2 +3 p
3
at A 1!2!P (-P)
4 Not detected 2 3! 2 3 p
2 _ 3 p3
at S 2.11p (l-p)
6 Not detected 3 3! p3 (I-P) 0  3
at G 3!0!




In the sections that follow, we describe the airport security events, model the related
probabilities of events, determine key points and values on the probability functions, and
determine local minima and maxima of the functions by using the calculus. The key points
and values, and the local minima and maxima, characterize the probability of non detection
(our airport security metric), and identify the optimal non detection probabilities at the ticket
counter, security station, and gate that imply policy decisions for government, airport, and
airline managers. In developing an optimal solution, we strive for optimality across all
entities and personnel within the scope of this research -- airlines; airport security personnel,
security database, and equipment; FAA; and TSA - rather than a single entity [HILO I]. This
is achieved by modeling the ticket counter, security station, and gate as a single integrated
security system.
It is important to note that an "optimal solution" provided by a model may not br optimal
in the eyes of the decision makers responsible for airport security. They are the final arbiters of
what constitutes a good security policy {HILO I].
Event 2: Terrorist not detected at ticket counter (A)
x = I attempt at non detection at A; n =3 possible attempts
Applying the binomial distribution, the probability of Event 2 = PAf:
P~=3! 1•







For PAf= 1, 3 p - 6 p2 +3 p =1, 3 p - 6 p2 +3p3 -1 =0
(4)
Solving for the roots of (4), p = 1.475; this value is obviously infeasible
For PAf = 0, p = 0, p = 1; only p = 0 is a realistic solution (i.e., PAf should = 0 when p = 0; it
should not equal 0 when p = 1). The rate of change of PAf with p is given by equation (5):
"dPAf =3-12p+9p2 =0, 3p 2 - 4p + 1 = 0
dp
(5)
4+-,[16-4(3)(1) 4±2 2 ±1
6 6 3 3
(6)




For p d = 1, 2 -12 + 18 = 6 > PAf minimum
For P2 = .3333, d2 PAf = - 12 + (18) (.3333) = - 6.0 > PAf maximumd2 p
For pl = 1, PAf = (3) (1) - (6) (1) + (3) (11) = 0
For P2 = .35, PAf = (3) (.3333) - (6) (.3333)2 + (3) (.3333)3 = .4444
As shown in Figure 1, where PAf is plotted against p, the maximum value of PAf = .4444
occurs at p = .3333. After that, PAf decreases with p, becoming 0 at p =1. The reason for the
decrease is that the binomial representation of equation (2) is not only a function of probability of
non detection p but also a function of the probability of detection (1 -p) at the ticket counter. At p
= .3333, p' begins to exceed (1-p) 2 in equation (2). Thus the optimal p represents the resolution of
these counteracting factors. The policy implication suggested by this result is that the FAA,
airport managers, and airline managers would attempt to improve security at ticket counters (e.g.,
use of computerized security database) so that p would be reduced to a value much lower than
.3333.
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Rgure 1. Probability of Non Detection at Ticket Counter (PAM) vs. p
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Event 4: Terrorist not detected at security station (S)
x = 2 attempts at non detection at S; n =3 possible attempts
Applying the binomial distribution, the probability of Event 4 = Psf:
Psf= 3! p2 (1-p)=3p (-p)
2!1!
(8)
Psf = 3 p2 - 3 p
3
(9)
For Psf =1, 3 p2 -3 p3 = 1,3 p2 -3 p3 _ 1 =0
Solving for the roots of (8), p = 1.264; this value is obviously infeasible
For Psf = 0, p = 0, p = 1; only p = 1 is realistic solution (i.e., Psf should = 0 when p = 0; it
should not equal 0 when p = 1). The rate of change of Psf with p is given by equation (10):
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dPSf -6p-9p2 =0,2p-3p 2 =0
dp
(10)
-2± [4-4(-30(0) -2± V2 1 1.4192
-6 -6 3 6




For p, = .65, d2PSf - 6 - (18) (.65) = -5.7 = Psf maximum
d2p
d2 PSf
For pI = 0, d - 6 - (18) (0) = 6 = Psf minimum
d 2p
For Pi = .65, Psf = (3) (.65)2 - 3 (.65)3 = .4436
For pi = 0, Psf = 0
As shown in Figure 2, where Psf is plotted against p, the maximum value of Psf = .4436
occurs at p = .65. After that, Psf decreases with p, becoming 0 at p =1. The reason for the decrease
is that, while the binomial representation of equation (2) increases with p, (1-p) -- the probability
of terrorist being detected -- decreases with p. Thus the optimal p represents the resolution of
these counteracting factors. The policy implication suggested by this result is that the FAA,
airport managers, and TSA managers would attempt to improve security at security stations (e.g.,
use of computerized luggage checking system) so that p would be reduced to a value much lower
than .65.
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Figure 2. Probability of Non Detection at Security Station, Psf, vs. p
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Event 6: Terrorist not Detected at 2ate (G)
x = 3 attempts at non detection out of n = 3 total attempts
Applying the binomial distribution, the probability of Event 6 = PGf:
3~f ! P3 (-)0 =P3
Pf 3!0!
(12)
As shown in Figure 3, where PGf is plotted against p, the maximum value of PGf = 1.0 occurs
at p = 1.0. In this case, PGf increases monotonically. The reason for this is that there is only a p
non detection term in equation (12); no I-p detection term. The policy implication suggested by
this result is that the FAA, airport managers, airline managers, and TSA managers would attempt
to improve security at the ticket counters and at security stations to the extent that terrorists would
be detected be/bre they reach the gate, because after they reach the gate, there is little opportunity
for detection, as shown in Figure 3.
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Since the gate is the last place to stop the terrorist within the scope of the model -- PGf is our
metric of the quality of the security system -- the lower the better - consistent with cost,
personnel and technology constraints. Decision makers could gauge the performance of their
security system against this metric [HILO I].
Figure 3. Probability of Non Detection at Gate, PGf vs. p
1,2000-
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Event 5: Terrorist Detected at gate (G):
x = 0 attempts at non detection out of n = 3 total attempts is equivalent to a successful
detection.
Applying the binomial distribution, the probability of Event 5 (successful detection at G) =3! 0_3__ 2
PG, - (l p)-3 =l 3p+ 3p 2-p3
(13)
This is also equal to:
PGs = I - PAf - Psf -PGf = I - (3 p -6 p2 +3 p 3) _ (3 p2 -3 p 3) _ p3 = 1 - 3 p + 3 p2 _ p3
For PGs =1, 1 - 3 p + 3 p2 _p 3 = 1,- 3 p+3 p2 _p3 =0
Solving for the roots of (13), no feasible roots were found
For PGs =0, p = 0
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d2pGs =6-6p,forp = 1,dPGs =0-6p d2 p
(15)
d3 PGs =-6 # 0, for pt = 1, PG, is neither a minimum nor maximum (16)
d3d~p
Forp, =1, PG,= 1 -3 +3 -1 =0
Forp 2 =0, PG,= 1 - 0 + 0- 0 = 1
As shown in Figure 4, where PG, is plotted against p, the maximum value of PG, = 1.0 occurs
at p = 0. In this case, PG, decreases monotonically. The reason for this is that there is only a I - p
detection term in equation (13); no p non detection term. The policy implication suggested by this
result is that the FAA, airport managers, and airline managers would attempt to improve security
at the gate so that p is not significantly greater than 0, because PG, decreases rapidly thereafter, as
shown in Figure 4.
Effectiveness of Detection at Gate
Now, we combine probability of non detection PG, with the reliability of the security
database Rd and the reliability of the security equipment R, to produce the effectiveness at the
gate. Before we present this effectiveness equation, we elaborate on the characteristics of Rd and
R, and show how redundancy increases reliability and, therefore, effectiveness.
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Definitions
Definitions that characterize the redundant security database and security equipment, and
their reliabilities are presented below.
d1: primary security database
d2: secondary security database
sl primary security equipment
s2: secondary security equipment
Rd.: overall reliability of security database
Rdl: reliability of primary security database
RdE: reliability of secondary security database
R,,: overall reliability of security equipment
Rs1 : reliability of primary security equipment (.96, 1.00, with a mean = .98 [CRS04]
R,2: reliability of secondary security equipment (.96, 1.00, with a mean = .98 CRS04]
Assumptions
The assumptions upon which the computations of reliability rest are as follows:
d, and d2 are independent (i.e., failure of d2 does not affect reliability of di)
s, and s2 are independent (i.e., failure of s, does not affect reliability of s2)
Reliability Equations
The reliability of parallel components is computed below.
Rd. = Rdl + Rd2 - Rd, Rd2: reliability of two components in parallel (i.e., redundancy) (16)
R~o = R,1 + R,2 - R,1 R,2: reliability of two components in parallel (i.e., redundancy) (17)
The redundancy characteristics are re-elaborated in Figures 5 and 6.
Data Values
Mean values of security database and security equipment reliabilities were obtained from
Congressional Research Service reports as follows:
Rdl, Rd2, Rst, Rs?: specified between 0 and 1, and randomized, with a mean -. 96 [CRS04]
Probability that the passenger is a terrorist = Pt: specified between 0 and 1, and randomized,
with a mean - .05 [CRS04]
Sensitivity Analysis
Randomization of Rdl, Rd2, Rs1 , Rs2 , and Pt, within the specified constraints, provides a degree
of sensitivity analysis.
Effectiveness
The effectiveness of terrorist detection at the gate is obtained by melding PGs with the
reliabilities obtained by redundant component analysis, as shown in equation (18).
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Effectiveness is a better metric of ability to detect terrorists than PG, alone, because, whereas
PG, is a function of the accuracy and speed of the database and equipment, it does not include
reliability. If accuracy and speed are high, but reliability is low, overall effectiveness of detection
will be low.
Effectiveness of security measures at the gate = EG:
EG = PGa Rd. Rs. = (1 - p)3 (Rdl + Rd2 - Rd, Rd2) (Rsl + R,2 - R•1 R,2) (18)
Also, using equations (16) and (17), EG = (1- p) 3 & do Rs,
(19)






For p, = P2 = 1, dEG2 - 0, = neither minimum or maximumdp2
For P, =1, EG, = 0
For P2 = 0, EG = Rdo Rso
The policy implication of Figure 7, where EG is plotted against p is to make Rd,, Rd2, Rs1,
R,2 as high as possible, because from equations (16) and (17), this will maximize Rd. and R~o,
respectively. Of course, this plan must be consistent with cost and technical considerations
(i.e., state of the practice with respect to achieving reliability). Doing this will maximize EG at
probability of non detection = p = 0, as can be seen in Figure 7.
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Figure 5. Redundancy in Security Database System
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Figure 6. Redundancy in Security Equipment System
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Evaluation of Relative Terrorist Threats at the Ticket Counter, Security Station, and
Gate
Figure 8 quantifies what seems intuitive about a terrorist escaping detection at the ticket
counter, security station, and gate. That, is the more stations that fail to detect the terrorist, the
easier it is for him to go undetected at succeeding stations. In Figure 8, this is portrayed by
the optimal probability of non detection p increasing from ticket counter to security station,
and, finally, the probability of non detection increasing monotonically with p, at the gate. The
policy implication is clear: stop the terrorist as soon as possible, preferably at the ticket
counter. This objective is crucial when we consider that the terrorist's chances of achieving at
least partial success (i.e., high probability of non detection) exceeds 75 per cent, according to
[JOH91]. According to the model, as Figure 8 shows, this level of success would not be
achieved at the ticket counter or security station but could be accomplished at the gate.
Unfortunately, the ticket counters are under the control of the airlines and are the entity
least subject to control by the government. A compromise solution might be to emphasize
detection at the security station because it is under the control of the TSA and airport
management and has the advantage of containing luggage checking equipment and, in the
future may be equipped with a security database, as an additional check on passengers.
Figure 7. Effectiveness of Detection at the Gate, EG, vs. p
1,2000
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Actors and Facilities
As shown in Figure 0, the security process actors are airline ticket agents, security station
personnel (TSA and airport luggage screeners), and airline personnel at the gate; not shown is the
flight crew. The security measures exercised by the crew are beyond the scope of this research.
For the security system to work, there must be communication and coordination among these
actors. The 9/11 report states that better coordination between the FAA and the airlines is needed
[911, p. 10]. In addition, as stated in [JOH91]: "Good airport security involves outthinking the
terrorist. It also involves cooperation among all agencies that can, together, block security
loopholes that begins with ticket purchase and ends when the plane takes off'. In response, TSA
is developing a computer network to tie together administrative, passenger screening, and
baggage screening areas [DHS05].
The TSA has obvious influence over airport and airline security personnel. In the model, this
is accomplished, in part, by the security database. This capability seems to be lacking in airports
at present. In addition to the database, an important contributor to terrorist detection is the number
and quality of airport screeners. With respect to the former, TSA reports that the number of
screeners has dropped from 60,000 to 45,000 due to insufficient funding [CSI04]. An additional
concern is that the DHS Inspector General issued a report in September 2004 stating that Federal
screening improvements were needed in training, equipment, and technology, policy and
procedures, and management and supervision [SEC05]. Improvements in equipment and
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technology could be achieved by using highly reliable and effective security database and
security equipment for checking carry on luggage, checked luggage, and cargo.
In the model, the flight crew does not have access to the database because airline personnel at
the gate would provide a security check prior to passenger boarding. The gate represents a further
opportunity for passenger security database checking, before the passenger boards [JOH91].
However, having a fourth security check on board the aircraft might be a feature to consider.
Information Flow
Information flow, as opposed to physical flow, which is shown in Figure 0, is shown in
Figure 9. This figure shows the important quantities associated with queuing at the various
security checking facilities. An objective of this section is to expose security vulnerabilities that
may not have been recognized heretofore.
Definitions
Refer to Figure 9 when reading the definitions:
kA: mean rate at which passengers approach the ticket counter in passengers per minute
kS: passenger input rate at Security Station: mean rate at which passengers approach the
security station in passengers per minute
kG: passenger input rate at Gate : mean rate at which passengers approach the gate in
passengers per minute
PA :passenger service rate at Ticket Counter: mean rate passengers can be served at the
ticket counter in passengers per minute
p S :passenger service rate at Security Station: mean rate passengers can go through the
security check at the security station in passengers per minute
P G :passenger service rate at Gate: mean rate passengers can be boarded at the gate in
passengers per minute
P A:utilization at Ticket Counter: mean fraction of time that ticket counter is busy serving
passengers
ps:utilization at Security Station : mean fraction of time security station is busing doing
security checks on passengers
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Figure 9. Security Checking Information Flow
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.A :passenger service rate at Ticket Counter C.: carry on luggageC,: checked luggage
passenger service rate at Securit Station Ch: luggage for cargo bay
P G :passenger service rate at Gate S,: biological weapons
MA: number of servers at Ticket Counter S.: chemical weapons
Ms: number of servers at Security Station Sn: nuclear weapons
MG: number of servers at Gate
PG :utilization at the Gate: mean fraction of time that the agents at the gate are busy serving
passengers
Passenger Security Processing Scenario
Passengers approach the ticket counter with a mean input rate of 4A passengers per
minute. The queue characteristics at the ticket counter are the number of agent stations (i.e.,
servers) MA, queue utilization pA, and queue service rate JIA in passengers per minute. In addition,
the terrorist could be carrying on luggage C., checking luggage Ch, or requesting that luggage be
delivered to the cargo bay of the plane Ca. The concern about cargo has received increase
emphasis of late because TSA is not only responsible for passenger security but cargo security as
well [CSI04].
It is interesting to note the practice of El Al Airlines that first x-rays baggage destined for the
cargo hold and then subjects it to depressurization to simulate flight conditions [JOH91]. The
concept is that either the x-rays will expose weapons or depressurization will cause premature
detonation. In addition, it has been recommended that vapor sniffing machines be added to the x-
ray capability [JOH91 ].
Furthermore, "the success of TSA in fulfilling its aviation security mission depends heavily
on the quality of its staff and the capability and reliability of the equipment (i.e., overall reliability
R,) to screen passengers and cargo in order to identify terrorists and terrorists' weapons, while
minimizing disruption to public mobility and commerce "[SKI05].
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Integrating Probability qf Non Detection with Queue Characteristics
Now, we integrate the probability of non detection with the queue characteristics of the
stations, such as the station service rate. Why would there be this relationship? The answer is that
as the personnel at the stations are pressured to process passengers at increasing rates, their ability
to detect terrorists decreases as they are distracted by the growing passenger flow rate. Therefore,
we expect the probability of non detection to increase with increasing service rate (i.e., increasing
number of passengers serviced per unit time).
To determine the mean input rate at the ticket counter ?kA, compute equation (23):
A= C /t
(23)
where C = plane mean capacity = 400 passengers (assumed) and t is the time required to process
passengers at the three facilities = 100 minutes (assumed). Therefore, k•A = 4 passengers per
minute (mean).
A security vulnerability could be created by the agents becoming overloaded by the size of
the queue with the result that security checking becomes inadequate. Indeed, this very factor was
discovered in the airports of Europe where passengers going through the screening process
produced the assembly line effect, causing security personnel to become much less vigilant
[JOH91]. This vulnerability is represented by the queue utilization PA, as given by equation (24),
taking into account the overall reliability of the security checking equipment Ro. Recall from
Figure 0, that we are concerned with the reliability Ro of the ticket counter, security station, and
gate. Thus, Ro appears in the queuing equations below.








Since the service rate at the ticket counter PA = the input rate at the security station ks, (see





Since the service rate at the security station jas = the input rate at the gate ?kG, (see Figure 9),




Equations (25, 26, and 27) indicate that the vulnerability could be mitigated by reducing Rso
or increasing the number of servers. Interestingly, reducing Rso, while helping to close this
vulnerability, would decrease the Effectiveness of Detection at the gate! (see equation 18). Thus,
there is a tradeoff between Rso and the number of servers, as they affect the E1jQctiveness f
Detection and service rate, respectively.
At this point, we provide an example, to illustrate the analysis of the results of the
example calculations of the relationships between service rate and number of servers, between
probability of non detection and service rate, and between probability that the passenger is a
terrorist and the estimated number of terrorists:
The data used in this example are the following:
Rso = Rs1 + Rs2 - Rs, Rs2: reliability of two components in parallel
(28)
Rs1, Rs2, Rsl, Rs2: mean ý .98
PA = .8 (assumed from observation of ticket counter operations)
ps = .9 (assumed from observation of security station operations: higher service rate
requirement that ticket counter)
MA = 1. 20
Ms = 1. 20
Pt = probability that passenger is a terrorist = N / C (on plane)
(29)
N= 0.- 10 terrorists on plane
C: Capacity of plane = number of passengers. See Table I




In Figure 10, we see that the service rate at the ticket counter pA decreases rapidly with
the number of servers MA, at first, but then decreases less rapidly later, reaching an optimal value
at PA = .62 passengers per minute; this occurs at MA = 8 servers. The optimal PA is obtained from
Figure 11, where the probability of non detection at ticket counter PAf is maximum at PIA = .62. A
possible explanation for this relationship in Figure 11 is that initially the ticket agents are unable
to cope with the passenger input rate XA, thus allowing an increase in the probability of non
detection PAf. Eventually, at service rate PIA = .62, the agents adjust, get the security process under
control, and PAf decreases. The policy implication for airline managers is that providing more
than eight agents, (see Figure 10), ftom a security standpoint, would be a waste of money and
personnel. Of course, this may not be the correct policy from the standpoint of customer
satisfaction.
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Figure 12, illustrates dramatically the danger in letting a terrorist past the ticket counter:
In Figure 11, we saw that after the service rate at the ticket counter reached .62 passengers per
minute, the probability of non detection steadily decreases. No such benign condition exists at the
security station, where the probability of non detection increase monotonically with service rate.
Therefore, the policy implication for airline and airport managers is to stop the terrorist at the
ticket counter!
Analysis of Terrorist Factors
Figure 13 shows the relationship between the probability that a passenger is a terrorist Pt
and the estimated number of passengers who are terrorists. We see that the Pt ranges between
.001 and .039, for N ranging between 0 and 9, respectively; these are significant probabilities in
light of the damage that terrorists did on 9/11, where a priori the probability of such a successjid
attack was considered insignificant. Therefore, since the number of terrorists, and their
probabilities of occurrence, are areas not under the control of airport management, the policy
implication is that they must be prepared to handle a number of incidents of high severity in the
foreseeable future, and it behooves them to greatly improve the reliability and accuracy of
detection hardware and software.
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Countermeasures to the threats, consistent with the previous section, involve the
following:
Ticket Counter and Gate
Reduce the service rate of airline personnel at the ticket counter (PA) and gate (PG) by
increasing the number of agents MA, MG, respectively. The first countermeasure may not be
attractive to the airlines because of the personnel cost involved and limited space for additional
personnel. The second countermeasure may be even less attractive because the number of gates is
governed by airport design. More space could be considered when airports are redesigned or
when new airports are constructed.
Security Station
Reduce the service rate of the security station (ps) by increasing the number of stations
Ms. This option is attractive because the TSA controls TSA personnel and equipment and airport
screeners. Thus, Congressional funding might be considered for more security personnel and
equipment, airport space permitting.
Increase the reliability of the security station equipment Rs. This quantity influences
security not only at the security station, but at the ticket counter and gate as well.
Security Database
As we have seen, the quality of the security database can have a pervasive effect on the
ability to detect terrorists. Since the security database is accessed by all facilities, its reliability
could be considered a high priority for Congressional funding.
What If Analysis
Terrorist with False Identification
One of the critical situations that would mitigate against terrorist detection: what if the
terrorist carries a false identification? This means that the security database checks at the ticket
counter, security station, and gate could fail. Then, the only facility to catch the terrorist is the x-
ray equipment at the security station for checking luggage. The implication of this is that the
terrorist could only be stopped at the security station. With only the luggage check to stop a
terrorist, we now need a probability of non detection Psf < .65, as shown in Figure 8, for the
security station, as opposed to a probability of non detection PAf < .35, for the ticket counter, also
shown in Figure 8. At the security station, Psf does not decline until .65, as opposed to PAf
declining at .35, in the case of the ticket counter. If the database check were working at the ticket
counter, it would be easier to catch the terrorist there, as shown in Figure 8. However, what if the
ticket counter security check is not working! What is the policy implication of this scenario? It
means that the TSA and airport and airline managers need to operate as though the security
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database will fail at all stations (even with redundant equipment), and the only line of defense is
luggage x-ray equipment. Each manager must assess the security threat in a worst case scenario
and guarantee that an adequate level of security is maintained.
Database and Equipment Failures
Another "what if' situation, with less adverse consequences than the above, is when the
primary security database equipment d, fails or the primary security equipment s1 fails. This
adversity is covered by the redundant back up equipment d2 and s2, respectively. The implication
for management in this case is to have a switchover and repair policy that can bring all units back
on line as soon as feasible.
Security Station Performance
"What if' the queue characteristics that were evaluated in the "Integrating Probability of
Non Detection with Queue Characteristics" section, do not hold. For example, what if we use the
Department of Transportation goal that passenger wait time for security processing not exceed 10
minutes [CRS04] (e.g., at the security station): t, < 10 minutes.
Actually, the Bureau of Transportation Statistics found, in 2003 [CRS04], that t, = 18 minutes
(mean). We will evaluate and compare the goal with the real world experience to note the effect
of passenger wait time on the probability of non detection at the security station. Continuing the
analysis, and noting that the reciprocal of the service time is equal to the service rate (i.e., p, = 1 /
t,), we have the following equations:
t = total time in security station system (wait time = tsw + service time = tss) (30)
Case 1: tsw < 10 minutes per passenger:
t< _ (10 + tss)
(31)
tss > (tst -10)
(32)
ts< (I / Ps) + 10 minutes per passenger
(33)
Case 2: tw = 18 minutes per passenger (mean):
tst= 18 + ts,
(34)
tss =t - 18
(35)
ts= (I / Ps) + 18 minutes per passenger (mean)
(36)
Now from equation (26), we have:
P-ARso
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Figure 14. Total Time of Security Check at Security Station,tst, vs. Probability of Non
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Combining (26) with (33), we obtain equations (37) for Case 1:
PSMs+0tA< P s 10st - ARs
(37)




The results of this analysis are shown in Figure 14 for Case I (equation 37) and Case 2
(equation 38). The two curves are separated by a time of 8 minutes, as the two equations indicate.
By providing upper bound and mean values, a band of total time of processing passengers tst is
provided that airport managers can use for estimating tst for a given value of probability of non
detection Psf at the security station. In addition, we note that if the managers lose control of
passenger processing time, and it exceeds the allowable band, Psf will increase.
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Conclusions
Based on the foregoing analysis that showed a preference for security improvements that
could be implemented under Federal control and funding, we reach the following conclusions:
security station
Increase the accuracy and reliability of security checking equipment
Increase the number and quality of security personnel and servers
All Facilities
Implement, if the system does not exist, a high accuracy and reliable security database at the
nation's airports
For existing databases, increase their accuracy and reliability
Maintain a centralized database of all passenger flight activity and perform security checks at
all security points, using this database.
Include the use of fingerprints or photographs in the database of passengers as one way of
positively identifying each passenger on each flight. However, this kind of surveillance
would likely face serious legal and privacy challenges [BBC05].
Future Research Directions
The focus of future research will be to visit several major airports and hold discussions with
airport managers for the purpose of collecting detailed security data and to obtain their opinions
about the validity of the model. In addition, we will attempt to validate the model, based on the
collected data, and to modify the model, if necessary.
References
[911] The 9/11 Commission Report: Final Report of the National Commission on Terrorist
attacks upon the United States, Claitor's Publishing Division. Baton Rouge, LA, 2004.
[AIR] AirSafe.com (undated)
[BBC05] British Broadcasting Company, Thursday, 16 December, 2004, 12:21 GMT.
[BEN05] Rep. Bennie G. Thompson, Ranking Member, Committee on Homeland Security,
U.S. House of Representatives, February 2005.
[CKE05] Clarke Kent Ervin, "A To-Do List for Chertoff', The Washington Post, Feb
68
[COR] Anthony H. Cordesman, Terrorism, Asymmetric Warfare, and Weapons of Mass
Destruction: Defending the U.S. Homeland, Prager, Westport, CT, 2002.
[CLA05] Richard Clark, Former National Coordinator for Counter-terrorism, "Looking Back
From 2011 - An Imagined History of the War on Terror", The Real State of the Union,
Senate Russell Building 325, 1/7/05.
[CRS04] Congressional Reference Service Report for Congress, Aviation Security: Issues
Before Congress Since September 11, 2001, Updated February 6, 2004, Bartholomew Elias.
[CS104] David Heyman and James Jay Carafano, CSIS, DHS 2.0, Rethinking the Department
of Homeland Security, The Heritage Foundation, December 13, 2004.
[DHS05] Budget in Brief, Department of Homeland Security, FY2006.
[HIL01] Fredrick S. Hillier and Gerald J. Lieberman, Introduction to Operations Research,
Seventh Edition, McGraw Hill, 2001.
[HOU05] "Provisions of Immigration Bill", CQ Today, Friday. February 11, 2005.
[JOH91] Peter St. John, Air Piracy, Airport Security, & International Terrorism: Winning the
War Against Hijackers, Quorum, 1991.
[MSN05] MSNBC.com, Report: FAA had many pre-9/11 warnings, The Associated Press,
Updated: 1:05 p.m. ET Feb. 10, 2005.
[SEC05] "Security Swap", Government Executive, January 2005.
[SKI05] Statement of Richard L. Skinner, Acting Inspector General, U.S. Department Of
Homeland Security, Before The Committee On Homeland Security And Governmental
Affairs, United States Senate, January 26, 2005.
[USS05] U.S. Senate Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Pre-
hearing Questionnaire for the Nomination of Michael Chertoff to be Secretary of Homeland
Security.
[TUR93] Wayne C. Turner, et al, Introduction to Industrial and Systems Engineering, Third
Edition, Prentice Hall, 1993.
[WAR05] Statement by Senator John Warner, R, VA, during the confirmation hearing for the
nominee for Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security, February 2, 2005.
69
Appendix: Spreadsheet Data and Computations
P PAf Psf PGf PG, Rdl Rd' RAl R,2 EG
0 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.9942 0.9897 0.9822 0.9991 0.9999
0.05 0.1354 0.0071 0.0001 0.8574 0.9840 0.9776 0.9757 0.9608 0.8563
0.1 0.2430 0.0270 0.0010 0.7290 0.9708 0.9817 0.9892 0.9764 0.7284
0.15 0.3251 0.0574 0.0034 0.6141 0.9906 0.9910 0.9861 0.9983 0.6141
0.2 0.3840 0.0960 0.0080 0.5120 0.9901 0.9990 0.9819 0.9612 0.5116
0.25 0.4219 0.1406 0.0156 0.4219 0.9606 0.9757 0.9755 0.9937 0.4214
0.3 0.4410 0.1890 0.0270 0.3430 0.9858 0.9848 0.9617 0.9771 0.3426
0.35 0.4436 0.2389 0.0429 0.2746 0.9777 0.9940 0.9914 0.9950 0.2746
0.4 0.4320 0.2880 0.0640 0.2160 0.9655 0.9924 0.9704 0.9708 0.2158
0.45 0.4084 0.3341 0.0911 0.1664 0.9882 0.9756 0.9829 0.9705 0.1662
0.5 0.3750 0.3750 0.1250 0.1250 0.9660 0.9807 0.9826 0.9610 0.1248
0.55 0.3341 0.4084 0.1664 0.0911 0.9654 0.9994 0.9623 0.9831 0.0911
0.6 0.2880 0.4320 0.2160 0.0640 0.9805 0.9803 0.9832 0.9989 0.0640
0.65 0.2389 0.4436 0.2746 0.0429 0.9807 0.9844 0.9706 0.9987 0.0429
0.7 0.1890 0.4410 0.3430 0.0270 0.9683 0.9992 0.9750 0.9916 0.0270
0.75 0.1406 0.4219 0.4219 0.0156 0.9655 0.9673 0.9889 0.9875 0.0156
0.8 0.0960 0.3840 0.5120 0.0080 0.9882 0.9965 0.9905 0.9608 0.0080
0.85 0.0574 0.3251 0.6141 0.0034 0.9652 0.9669 0.9605 0.9652 0.0034
0.9 0.0270 0.2430 0.7290 0.0010 0.9974 0.9852 0.9940 0.9851 0.0010
1 0.0000 0.0000 1.0000 0.0000 0.9645 0.9697 0.9734 0.9752 0.0000
mean 0.9774 0.9846 0.9789 0.9805
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R, R,. Mv RA Ms Rs MG  G P, N C
0.9999 1.0000 1 5.00 1 5.555 1 7.936 0.051 5 106
0.9996 0.9990 2 2.50 2 1.386 2 0.989 0.035 7 189
0.9995 0.9997 3 1.67 3 0.617 3 0.294 0.001 0 524
0.9999 1.0000 4 1.25 4 0.347 4 0.124 0.016 4 280
1.0000 0.9993 5 1.00 5 0.222 5 0.063 0.017 4 228
0.9990 0.9998 6 0.83 6 0.154 6 0.037 0.023 9 375
0.9998 0.9991 7 0.71 7 0.113 7 0.023 0.011 6 550
0.9999 1.0000 8 0.62 8 0.087 8 0.015 0.005 2 296
0.9997 0.9991 9 0.56 9 0.068 9 0.011 0.039 9 223
0.9997 0.9995 10 0.50 10 0.055 10 0.008 0.019 5 259
0.9993 0.9993 11 0.45 11 0.046 11 0.006
1.0000 0.9994 12 0.42 12 0.039 12 0.005
0.9996 1.0000 13 0.38 13 0.033 13 0.004
0.9997 1.0000 14 0.36 14 0.028 14 0.003
1.0000 0.9998 15 0.33 15 0.025 15 0.002
0.9989 0.9999 16 0.31 16 0.022 16 0.002
1.0000 0.9996 17 0.29 17 0.019 17 0.002
0.9988 0.9986 18 0.28 18 0.017 18 0.001
1.0000 0.9999 19 0.26 19 0.015 19 0.001
0.9989 0.9993 20 0.25 20 0.014 20 0.001
0.9996 0.9996
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